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1 Introduction
Formulation of information ﬂow security model requires at least the following ingredients : an abstract model
to represent the system under observation and to describe its behaviour, and security properties or constraints
which are concerned with and regulate the ﬂow of information between diﬀerent parts of the system.
Several information ﬂow security models have been proposed over the recent years which include Non-
Interference (NI, [GM82]), Non-Deducibility on Input (NDI, [Sut86]), Non-Deducibility on Strategy (NDS,
[WJ90]), Restrictiveness (RES, [McC88]), and Forward Correctability (FC, [JT88]), Non-Deducibility on Strat-
egy (NDS, [WJ90]) and Information Flow Secure Nets (IFSN, [Var90]).
An important characteristic of an information ﬂow security property is whether or not it is preserved under
composition. This feature is extremely important as systems are often connected together to form composite
or networked systems thereby sharing information and resources. Moreover, since the design and analysis of a
complex system is often carried out by dividing it into smaller cooperating subsystems, it is very important for
a designer to be provided with a tool which enables him to design a secure system step by step, in a divide and
conquer fashion.
Non-Interference was one of the ﬁrst proposed information ﬂow security properties. In this approach, a
deterministic automaton is used to model systems. It takes an input stream from the users and generates
deterministically, for each user, an output, that is a particular view of the system for that user. The presence or
absence of information ﬂow is determined using the concept of non interference between users whereby a user is
said to be interfering with another user if he can, by changing his inputs to the system, modify the view of the
other. A nice feature of the Non-Interference approach is its simplicity, while its main limitation is the choice
of a deterministic model.
The search for a security model able to treat non-deterministic systems led to the deﬁnition of Non-
Deducibility on Inputs. NDI still has a major problem in that it is not composable since an insecure system
may be obtained as a result of connecting two secure systems.
Steps towards a suitable deﬁnition of security enjoying the composability property led to the deﬁnitions
of RES and FC. Though they achieve composability, they introduce other restrictions which are somewhat
unrealistic. RES assumes that systems are input total, that is, systems are always ready to take inputs delivered
to them or, equivalently, systems are inﬁnitely fast. FC assumes that systems are input extensible, a property
equivalent to the input total one; a system can collect any number of inputs from the users before delivering
the ﬁrst output.
The Non-Deducibility on Strategies approach extends the NDI approach by taking into account in the
deﬁnition, the possible behaviour of the system when a composition operation is executed. The model is
suﬃciently general to treat non-deterministic systems. However, it is synchronous in that the users send their
inputs and receive their outputs at the same time.
The Information Flow Security Net model describes a security property based on the actual ﬂow of informa-
tion. The model is able to deal with non-deterministic systems and can handle asynchronous behaviour. Work is
being carried out in deﬁning composition operators which preserve the information ﬂow security property when
two such nets are connected together. A paper describing this work is being presented at the 1991 Computer
Security Foundations Workshop [Var91].
From above, we can see that there has been a large amount of work done in the area of information ﬂow
security; however, it seems that not much eﬀort has been dedicated to the consideration of the underlying model,
a matter the present paper is devoted to. We believe that the underlying system model plays an important role
in the formulation of an information ﬂow security model.
Diﬀerent notions of information ﬂow security that have been presented are often based on diﬀerent underlying
system models. This disallows the possibility of a true comparison between the diﬀerent information ﬂow
deﬁnitions, and a proper understanding of their mutual relationships. Moreover, it obstructs the comprehension
of the true power of an information ﬂow security property deﬁnition. Such observations constitute the basis
for our belief that there is a need for a unifying underlying framework and the need for a model without many
unrealistic assumptions.
The model we present in this paper is based on Petri nets and uses the work described in [Var89], [Var90]
and [Rou86]. We will refer to this model as FIFO Information Flow Nets (FIFN). Petri nets provide a deeply2 2 FIFO INFORMATION FLOW NETS (FIFN) SECURITY MODEL
mathematically founded approach to system modeling, and are capable of grasping the essence of concurrency.
Furthermore, they have a straightforward interpretation in terms of processes and channels.
One of our intentions is to show that the FIFO Information Flow Nets are a good candidate as a unifying
framework capable of representing several of the above mentioned information ﬂow security properties. To
support this claim, we formulate the deﬁnitions of Non-Interference and Non-Deducibility using this model. As
this model is diﬀerent from the ones on which the original deﬁnitions were based on, we have had to make
some fundamental choices in interpreting them within the context of net theory. However, we believe that we
have remained completely faithful to the original concepts and that our deﬁnitions of Non-Interference between
Places (NIP) and Non-Deducibilty on Views (NDV) correspond directly to NI and NDI.
Having considered a single underlying model in which both NIP and NDV can be represented, the next natu-
ral step was to consider compositionality. We consider a general composition operation and study the behaviour
of NIP and NDV with respect to this operation. In doing this, in fact, we follow Millen’s proposal [Mln90] in de-
composing the composition operation into two primitive operations, namely Parallel Composition and Feedback.
It will be seen that neither NIP nor NDV are preserved under the feedback operation.
Analysis of non-composability of NIP and NDV in the FIFN context, led to a new deﬁnition of information
ﬂow, which we will refer to as the Feedback Non-Deducibility on Views (FNDV). We will then show that FNDV
is a composable security property. It is interesting to note that this deﬁnition shares some characteristics with
Non-Deducibility on Strategies.
The paper is organized as follows:
• In Section 2 we deﬁne the FIFN model and give deﬁnitions of NIP and NDV. We also prove that neither
NDV implies NIP nor NIP implies NDV.
• In Section 3 we deﬁne the composition operation and show that neither NIP nor NDV are preserved under
composition.
• In Section 4 we deﬁne FNDV and prove that it is preserved under composition.
• Section 5 summarizes the main results achieved in this paper and considers some implications of this work.
• Appendix A recalls some basic deﬁnitions about Petri Nets.
2 FIFO Information Flow Nets (FIFN) Security Model
This section describes the FIFN security model. First, we give the deﬁnition of a FIFN; then we deﬁne NIP
and NDV. Finally, we show that NIP does not imply NDV and give a condition under which this is true. In this
subsection we build on the classical deﬁnition of Petri net (see appendix A) and FIFO nets [Rou86] to obtain
a model which is able to represent the security aspects of a system; note that the new model is still able to
handle the relevant aspects of concurrent and distributed systems design.
The approach lies somewhere between Information Flow Nets (IFN) proposed by the second author [Var89],
[Var90] and FIFO Nets [Rou86]. It shares with IFN mainly the interpretation of places and transitions and
the use of individual tokens manipulated by transitions, while it chooses to look at the contents of places as
ordered lists of tokens as in FIFO Nets. Hence we refer to it as FIFO Information Flow Nets (FIFN).
The general scenario that we consider consists of a collection of processes communicating with each other
over connecting channels, manipulating the information received and transfering it to another process. The
transitions represent processes and places represent channels between them. A place can belong to the input set
and output set of more than one transition. This can be used to model diﬀerent types of communication, e.g.,
buses, broadcasting. In our case, we interpret the places to be FIFO channels. We feel that this is adequate for
modeling the required security properties; furthermore the added beneﬁt is that this results in a simpler model.
We start the formal description of our model by introducing some well-known concepts and ﬁxing appropriate
notations for them.
As usual, given a set T, we denote by T ∗ the free monoid of strings on T. Composition of strings is indicated
by juxtaposition. The length of a string τ ∈ T ∗, i.e. the number of characters which it is composed by, is written3
as |τ|. The empty string is the (unique) string of length zero and is denoted by ǫ. In the following, since no
confusion is possible, we will also use |   | to indicate the cardinality of sets.
Given a ﬁnite set P, we deﬁne a numbered subset of P to be a pair (S,ℓ), where S ⊆ P and ℓ is an injective
function from S to the subset of natural numbers {1,...,|S|}. This results in associating a unique number to
each element of S. Therefore, we rarely give a numbered subset by deﬁning both S and ℓ: we rather write
S =  p1,...,pn  with the intended meaning that S = {p1,...,pn} and ℓ(pi) = i. The cardinality of (S,ℓ) is
the cardinality of S and will be indicated again as |(S,ℓ)|. Moreover, we will write p ∈ (S,ℓ) to mean that b is
a element of S and (S,ℓ)i, i = 1,...,|S|, to indicate the (unique) element p ∈ S such that ℓ(i) = i. In other
words, we treat (S,ℓ) both as a set and as a tuple. The set of numbered subsets of P will be denoted by T (P).
In order to simplify notation, we sometimes indicate the set of functions f : P → T as [P → T]. Moreover, the
notation for the cartesian product of n copies of a set T will be denoted as usual by T n.
In the following, we will assume a ﬁxed universe of tokens, i.e. in our setting the universe of messages that
can be exchanged between. We will refer to it as Tokens.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (FIFN)
A FIFO Information Flow Net is a 7-tuple given by N =  P,T,I,O,B,Transop,S,M  where:
• P is a ﬁnite set of places, each of which represents a channel through which information is exchanged
between system entities.
• T is a ﬁnite set of transitions, each of which corresponds to a system process.
• I : T → T (P) is the input function.
• O : T → T (P) is the output function.
• B : P → I N is the bound function, which associates a natural number with each place. The bound function
describes the size of the channel buﬀers.
• Transop : T →
S
n,m∈I N
h
Tokensn → ℘(Tokensm)
i
is a function associating an operation with each
transition in T in such a way that
Transop(t) : Tokens|I(t)| → ℘
￿
Tokens|O(t)|
￿
,
where I N is the set of natural numbers and ℘( ) denotes the power set construction. The function
Transop(t) is used to describe the manipulation of the input tokens by a transition.
• S ∈ [Pint → Tokens∗] is the initial state of the (internal places of the) net, where
Pinp =
n
p ∈ P
￿
￿
￿ ∃t ∈ T s.t. p ∈ O(t)
o
is the set of the input places of the net, and Pint = P \ Pinp where \ is the set diﬀerence operator.
S is such that ∀p ∈ Pint, |M(p)| ≤ B(p).
• M is the set of initial assignments for the input places of the net. Each element M ∈ M is an assignment
of admissible sequences of tokens to the input places, i.e. a function M ∈ [Pinp → Tokens∗] such that
∀p ∈ Pinp, |M(p)| ≤ B(p).
The initial assignment set is used to simulate the inputs a process can receive through a channel.
Moreover, FIFO Information Flow Nets have no isolated places, i.e.
∀p ∈ P ∃t ∈ T such that p ∈ I(t) ∪ O(t).
2
In addition to the set of input places of a net, we also need to describe the set of output places. These are
deﬁned in a similar manner to Pinp as
Pout =
n
p ∈ P
￿
￿
￿ ∃t ∈ T s.t. p ∈ I(t)
o
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Observe that Pint, Pinp and Pout, thanks to the condition in the previous deﬁnition, are disjoint. Although such
a condition is not strictly necessary, it is quite natural in our interpretation for places.
For the rest of the paper, we establish the convention that while talking about a net N, the symbols P, T,
I, O, Transop, S and M will denote the corresponding entities in Deﬁnition 2.1, even if not explicitly stated.
In case any possible confusion, we will use appropriate and self-explaining subscripts.
Few comments on the above deﬁnition are in order. We consider numbered subsets—essentially sets—of
places to be the input places of a transition instead of the classical bag. At a time, a process can remove one
input token from each input channel and deposit one output token to each output channel. This modiﬁcation
of the general deﬁnition of net (see Deﬁnition A.1), is not an heavy modelling restriction as any number of
channels is possible between two given processes. We also require a notation to distinguish the order of places
in the input and output sets of a transition. This is achieved by having I and O taking values in T (P).
Generally speaking, the formal structure of processes is still not completely clear. However, for the purpose
of this work, it is fair to describe a process by its input-output behaviour, i.e. by a function. This is the aim
of Transop. In order to capture the typical non-deterministic behaviour of processes, the domains of such
functions are power sets. Two kinds of channels can be recognized in a system: input and output channels, i.e.
channels through which the system exchanges information with the external environment, and internal channels,
which are not observable by external users. These are represented using Pinp, Pout and Pint.
Following this intuition about internal and external channels, a FIFN speciﬁes the initial state for its internal
places, S, and a set of “admissible” (or expected) behaviours for the external environment, M.
At each time, the state of the net is described by the sequences of tokens located at its places, i.e. by the
set of local state of each of its channels.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Markings)
A marking of a FIFN N is a function M : P → Tokens∗ such that ∀p ∈ P, |M(p)| ≤ B(p). 2
Notice therefore that S is not a marking of N because it does not deﬁne the contents of the input places of the
net. The set of initial markings associated with a FIFN is obtained by merging an initial assignment and the
initial state. The formal deﬁnition is as follows.
Let P0 and P1 be two disjoint sets. A pair of function f0 : P0 → X and f1 : P1 → X, where X is any set, deﬁne
a “sum” function f0 ⊕ f1 : P0 ∪ P1 → X in the obvious following way:
(f0 ⊕ f1)(p) =
(
f0(p) if p ∈ P0
f1(p) if p ∈ P1.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Initial Markings)
Given an FIFN N the set of initial markings is the set
MS = M ⊕ S =
n
M ⊕ S
￿
￿ ￿ M ∈ M
o
.
2
Observe that, thanks to the conditions on S and M in Deﬁnition 2.1, the functions in MS respect the bound
function and therefore are markings of N.
The restriction of a marking M to a subset P ′ of P will be denoted by MP ′. Moreover, given a set of markings
X we will use X/P ′ to denote the set {MP ′ |M ∈ X}.
To complete the deﬁnition of the model, we need to deﬁne the enabling and the ﬁring of a transition and
the computations of the net.
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Transition Enabled)
Given a FIFN N, a transition t ∈ T is said to be enabled at a marking M if
∀p ∈ P, p ∈ I(t) ⇒ |M(p)| ≥ 1 and p ∈ O(t) ⇒ |M(p)| < B(p).
This is denoted by M[t . 22.1 Non-Interference between Places 5
Therefore, a transition may ﬁre only if its ﬁring does not cause the bound function to be exceeded by the actual
length of the string of tokens in any of its output places. In other words, a transition may ﬁre only if there is
enough space in the FIFO queues to deliver the output.
Deﬁnition 2.5 (Firing Rule)
A transition t in a FIFN may ﬁre at a marking M if it is enabled. Firing results in a new marking M′′ deﬁned
as follows.
First the transition collects its inputs (α1,...,αn), where n = |I(t)| and αj is from place I(t)j, creating a
transitory marking M′:
M′(p) =
(
σ if p = I(t)j and M(p) = αjσ
M(p) if p  ∈ I(t)
where αj ∈ Tokens and σ ∈ Tokens∗.
Let the output, non-deterministically produced from the collected input, be (β1,...,βm) ∈ Transop(t)(α1,...,αn).
Then the transition delivers the outputs to the places in O(t), each βj to the corresponding O(t)j, and the mark-
ing M′′ is reached:
M′′(p) =
(
M′(p)βj if p = O(t)j
M′(p) if p  ∈ O(t).
The ﬁring of the transition t at M is denoted by M[t M′′. 2
The classical deﬁnitions of reachability and ﬁring sequence are unchanged.
Deﬁnition 2.6 (Firing Sequences)
A ﬁring sequence of a FIFN N is a ﬁnite sequence of transition ﬁrings M0[t1 M1[t2 ,...,[tn Mn, also denoted
by M0[t1t2 ...tn Mn, where M0 ∈ MS. 2
Deﬁnition 2.7 (Reachability Set)
Given a FIFN N and one of its initial markings M0, the reachability set for M0 is deﬁned to be the set
R(N,M0) =
n
M
′ ∈ [P → Tokens
∗]
￿
￿
￿ ∃σ ∈ T
∗ such that M0[σ M
′
o
. 2
2.1 Non-Interference between Places
In this subsection we deﬁne Non-Interference between Places (NIP) which corresponds to the concept of Non-
Interference introduced by Goguen and Meseguer in [GM82].
In the context of FIFO Information Flow Nets, we look at the input and the output places of a net as
channels through which the system represented by the net will communicate with other systems and users.
Note that users may be explicitly represented using nets themselves or implicitly—as we do most of the times—
represented using set of initial assignments M. Therefore it is natural to associate the users with the input and
output places of the net. Hence we will talk about users linked with a set of input and/or output places.
In the deﬁnition of Non-Interference, there is a clear notion of action performed by a group of users through
which they interfere with another group. In our approach we will associate the users that perform the actions
with the input places and the users that receive the eﬀects of those actions with the output places of the system
net. Hence the deﬁnition of NIP only makes sense between the input and the output places of the net.
Let us start with the deﬁnition of perturbation of a marking with respect to a set of places.
Deﬁnition 2.8 (Perturbation)
Let P ′ be a subset of P, the set of places of a FIFN N, and let M be a marking. Then we deﬁne perturbation
of M with respect to P ′ as
PP ′(M) =
n
M′ ∈ [P → Tokens∗]
￿
￿
￿ M′
(P\P ′) = M(P\P ′)
o
.
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Deﬁnition 2.9 (Non-Interference between Places (NIP))
Given a FIFN N and Pi ⊆ Pinp, Po ⊆ Pout, we say that Pi is non-interfering with Po, Pi |:Po, if and only if
∀M0 ∈ MS and ∀M′
0 ∈ PPi(M0) ∩ MS we have that R(N,M0)/Po = R(N,M′
0)/Po.
The fact that Pi does interfere with Po will be denoted as Pi   |:Po. 2
NIP enjoys the following properties:
Proposition 2.10 (NIP on Groups, part I)
For all Pi ⊆ Pinp and P1,P2 ⊆ Pout, we have that Pi |:(P1 ∪ P2) ⇒ Pi |:P1 and Pi |:P2.
Proof. Pi |:(P1 ∪ P2) implies that ∀M0 ∈ MS, ∀M′
0 ∈ PPi(M0) ∩ MS,
R(N,M0)/(P1 ∪ P2) = R(N,M
′
0)/(P1 ∪ P2).
This in turn implies that R(N,M0)/P1 = R(N,M′
0)/P1 and R(N,M0)/P2 = R(N,M′
0)/P2.
Hence Pi |:(P1 ∪ P2) ⇒ Pi |:P1 and Pi |:P2. 2
The above result has a clear interpretation. In fact, it can be written as: if Pi   |:P1 or Pi   |:P2 then Pi   |:(P1∪P2),
implying that if a user interferes with another user, so does he with any group containing that user.
Proposition 2.11 (NIP on Groups, part II)
For all P1,P2 ⊆ Pinp and Po ⊆ Pout, we have that (P1 ∪ P2)|:Po ⇒ P1 |:Po and P2 |:Po.
Proof. For any M0 ∈ MS, ∀M′
0 ∈ PP1(M0) ∩ MS, we have M′
0 ∈ P(P1∪P2)(M0). Using the deﬁnition of
(P1 ∪ P2)|:Po, we have R(N,M0)/Po = R(N,M′
0)/Po. Hence P1 |:Po.
Similarly we can show that P2 |:Po. 2
The above result can be written as: if P1   |:Po or P2   |:Po then (P1 ∪ P2)   |:P1. This implies that if a user does
interfere with another user, then any group containing the former user also interferes with latter user. Note
that the reverse arrow does not exist either in Proposition 2.10 or in Proposition 2.11. The following examples
illustrate these points.
In the examples given below, we deﬁne markings as set of pairs (p,M(p)). Moreover, input, output and
bound functions are not speciﬁed. The ﬁrst two are encoded in the pictures by assuming the convention that
places in the input or output set of a transition are drawn from left to right according to the crescent verse of
their indices; while the bound function, when not diﬀerently speciﬁed, must be considered the function wich
always yields 1. In the examples, S will always be the empty marking.
Example 2.12 (NIP on Groups, part III)
Refer to the ﬁgure shown alongside and consider the reverse arrow in Propo-
sition 2.11. Let MS be
n
{(p1,α),(p2,α,)(p,ǫ)},{(p1,ǫ),(p2,ǫ),(p,ǫ)}
o
, with
α ∈ Tokens, ǫ the empty string and Transop(t) is the function which produces
as output the input taken from p1 and forgets that from p2.
We have p1 |:p and p2 |:p, but {p1,p2}   |:p.
This shows that P1 |:Po and P2 |:Po  ⇒ (P1 ∪ P2)|:Po.
m m
m
?
@ @ R ￿ ￿ ￿ t
p1 p2
p 2
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Let N be the net in the ﬁgure shown alongside, with
MS =
n
{(p,α)},{(p,β)}
o
, α,β ∈ Tokens. Suppose that
Transop(t)(α) =
n
 α,β , β,α 
o
Transop(t)(β) =
n
 α,α , β,β 
o
and
Transop(t1) = identity = Transop(t2).
We have
R
￿
N,{(p,α)}
￿
/{p1} =
n
{(p1,α)},{(p1,β)}
o
= R
￿
N,{(p,β)}
￿
/{p1}
and
R
￿
N,{(p,α)}
￿
/{p2} =
n
{(p2,α)},{(p2,β)}
o
= R
￿
N,{(p,β)}
￿
/{p2}
But
R
￿
N,{(p,α)}
￿
/{p1,p2} =
n
{(p1,α),(p2,β)},{(p1,β),(p2,α)}
o
 =
n
{(p1,α),(p2,α)},{(p1,β),(p2,β)}
o
= R
￿
N,{(p,β)}
￿
/{p1,p2}.
Hence Pi |:P1 and Pi |:P2  ⇒ Pi |:(P1 ∪ P2).
m
m
m
m
m
?
￿ ￿ ￿ @ @ R
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
A A U
A A U
p
p1 p2
t
t1 t2
2
A comment is in order regarding the result of Example 2.13. At a ﬁrst glance, the absence of this property
could seem somewhat unnatural; however if we think about composition of systems and consider the situation
whereby a single user can be linked to the channels represented by P1 ∪ P2, then we can see that this result is
a valid one.
On the other hand, the result shown by Example 2.12 is an intuitive one; even if no one in P1 or in P2
interferes with Pi on its own, there could still be a subset of users in P1 ∪ P2 who are jointly interfering with
users in Pi.
It is hence seen that the problem arises due to possible cooperation between P1 and P2. To avoid this
situation, we can add a new condition and obtain the following:
Proposition 2.14
If ∀M0 ∈ MS, ∀M′
0 ∈ P(P1∪P2)(M0) ∩ MS
∃M′ ∈ (PP1(M0) ∪ PP2(M0)) ∩ MS s.t. M ∈ (PP1(M′) ∪ PP2(M′)) (1)
then Pi |:P1 and Pi |:P2 ⇒ Pi |:(P1 ∪ P2).
Proof. ∀M0 ∈ MS,∀M′
0 ∈ P(P1∪P2)(M0)∩MS, let us choose M′ as in the condition (1). Without loss of
generality, let us suppose that M′ ∈ PP1(M0) and M ∈ PP2(M′).
So, R(N,M0)/Pi = (since Pi |:P1) = R(N,M′)/Pi = (since Pi |:P2) = R(N,M)/Pi, which is the required
result. 2
It is worth pointing out that the condition (1) essentially asks for independent behaviours of users linked to P1
and P2. This condition seems to be a strong one. (In fact, it is not a necessary condition). However it does
illustrate what we want to achieve.
2.2 Non-Deducibility on Views
This subsection introduces Non-Deducibility on Views (NDV) which corresponds to Sutherland’s notion of
Non-Deducibility on Inputs [Sut86].
In order to simplify notations, let us establish the following conventions: given a net N,
Pext denotes Pinp ∪ Pout, i.e. P \ Pint;
∀Q ⊆ Pext, ℑ(Q) denotes Q ∩ Pinp and O(Q) denotes Q ∩ Pout;
∀{p1,...,pn} = Q ⊆ P, M(Q) denotes {M(p1),...,M(pn)}.
Observe that the last notational convention impies that M(∅) = ∅. Recall that, given a marking M and a subset
of places Q, MQ denotes the restriction of M to Q.
In order to model Sutherland’s notion in the FIFO Information Flow Nets framework, we ﬁrst need to give
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Deﬁnition 2.15 (Views)
Given a FIFN N, let Q ⊆ Pext. Then for each M0 ∈ MS deﬁne ViewM0(Q) to be the set
n
(vi,vo)
￿ ￿
￿ vi ∈ [ℑ(Q) → Tokens∗], vo ∈ [O(Q) → Tokens∗], ∃M ∈ R(N,M0) s.t. M0ℑ(Q) = vi, MO(Q) = vo
o
The set of views of Q is the union of the views on the set of initial markings, i.e.
View(Q) =
[
M0∈MS
ViewM0(Q).
2
Hence essentially a view is a pair of partial markings. The above deﬁnition basically means that a view of a set
of users is, as expected, all that they can see contemporarily, i.e., in the same computation. Two views of two
diﬀerent sets of users are compatible if they can be observed in the same computation. The formal deﬁnition is
given below.
Deﬁnition 2.16 (Compatibility)
Given a FIFN N, let P1 and P2 be subsets of P. Views (vi,vo) ∈ View(P1) and (wi,wo) ∈ View(P2) are
compatible, in symbols (vi,vo) ↑ (wi,wo), if and only if ∃M0 ∈ MS and M ∈ R(N,M0) such that
M0ℑ(P1) = vi, M0ℑ(P2) = wi, MO(P1) = vo and MO(P2) = wo.
2
Recall that in the case of Non-Interference, there exists the notion of action performed on the system to interfere
with someone. In the case of Non-Deducibility, there is the more general notion of deduction perfomed by a
user. In the context of FIFN, the latter results in a broader deﬁnition for NDV than for NIP; in fact, the NDV
deﬁnition is valid for every pair of subset of input and output places.
Deﬁnition 2.17 (Non-Deducibility on Views)
Let P1,P2 ⊆ Pext. We say that P1 and P2 are non-deducible (with respect to each other), P1   ←→ P2, if and
only if
∀(vi,vo) ∈ View(P1) and ∀(wi,wo) ∈ View(P2) we have that (vi,vo) ↑ (wi,wo). 2
In other words, the above deﬁnition states that there is no ﬂow of information between two groups of users
(linked to sets of channels P1 and P2 respectively) if each pair of views is compatible, i.e., each pair of views can
be observed in the same computation. This means that whatever the users in one group can see, they cannot
deduce anything about what the users in the other group observe.
It is worth pointing out that the relation     ←→   is symmetric, i.e., P1   ←→ P2 ⇒ P2   ←→ P1.
NDV has the following property:
Proposition 2.18 (NDV on Groups)
(P1 ∪ P2)   ←→ P3 ⇒ P1   ←→ P3 and P2   ←→ P3
Proof. For all (vi
1,vo
1) ∈ View(P1), there exists (vi
2,vo
2) ∈ View(P1∪P2) s.t. vi
2ℑ(P1) = vi
1 and vo
2O(P1) = vo
1.
Then, by hypothesis, for all (wi,wo) ∈ View(P3), we have that (vi
2,vo
2) ↑ (wi,wo) which implies that for
all (wi,wo) ∈ View(P3), (vi
1,vo
1) ↑ (wi,wo). This shows that P1   ←→ P3.
Similarly one can show that P2   ←→ P3. 2
This is quite a natural result; it can also be written in the following ways:
(i) (P1 ←→ P3 or P2 ←→ P3) ⇒ (P1 ∪ P2) ←→ P3;
(ii) (P3 ←→ P1 or P3 ←→ P2) ⇒ P3 ←→ (P1 ∪ P2),
where   ←→   stands for the negation of     ←→  .
Once again the reverse arrow in the Proposition 2.18 does not hold. This is illustrated by the following example.2.3 Relation between NIP and NDV 9
Example 2.19
Let N be the net in the ﬁgure shown alongside, with
MS =
n
{(p1,α),(p2,α),(p,ǫ)},{(p1,α),(p2,β),(p,ǫ)},
{(p1,β),(p2,α),(p,ǫ)},{(p1,β),(p2,β),(p,ǫ)}
o
α,β ∈ Tokens.
Suppose that
Transop(t)(α,β) = {α}, Transop(t)(β,α) = {α}
Transop(t)(α,α) = {β}, Transop(t)(β,β) = {β}.
We have {p1}   ←→ {p} and {p2}   ←→ {p} but {p1,p2} ←→ {p}.
This shows that P1   ←→ P3 and P2   ←→ P3  ⇒ (P1 ∪ P2)   ←→ P3.
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿ ?
@
@ R
￿
￿ ￿ t
p1 p2
p
2
The result in Example 2.19 means that even if it is possible to deduce something about P1 and P2 as a pair, it
can still be the case you may not be able to deduce anything about either P1 or P2.
2.3 Relation between NIP and NDV
Having deﬁned both Non-Interference and Non-Deducibility using a single underlying model, let us now consider
the relation between them.
We start by showing that NDV does not imply NIP. Consider the FIFN whose structure is shown in the
ﬁgure of Example 2.19 above. Moreover, suppose that
(i) MS =
h
{p1,p2} → {α,β}
i
, α,β ∈ Tokens;
(ii) Transop(t)(α,α) = β;
Transop(t)(α,β) = α;
Transop(t)(β,α) = β;
Transop(t)(β,β) = α.
Let M0 be {(p1,α),(p2,α)} ∈ MS, and M′
0 be {(p1,β),(p2,α)} ∈ P{p1}(M0) ∩ MS.
Then we have R
￿
N,M0
￿
/{p} =
n
{(p,α)}
o
 =
n
{(p,β)}
o
= R
￿
N,M′
0
￿
/{p}. Therefore, {p1}   |:{p}.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that {p1}   ←→ {p}, since View({p1,p}) =
h
{p1,p} → {alpha,β}
i
.
Now, consider the following example.
Example 2.20
Consider the net in the ﬁgure shown alongside, where
MS =
n
{(p1,α),(p2,β),(p3,ǫ),(p4,ǫ)},{(p1,β),(p2,γ),(p3,ǫ),(p4,ǫ)}
o
with α,β,γ ∈ Tokens.
Suppose that
Transop(t1)(α) = {α′}, Transop(t1)(β) = {β′}
Transop(t2)(γ) = {β′}, Transop(t2)(β) = {α′}, with α′,β′ ∈ Tokens.
We have {p1}|:{p3} but {p1} ←→ {p3}.
This shows that Pi |:Po  ⇒ Pi   ←→ Po.
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
? ?
? ?
t1 t2
p1 p2
p3 p4
2
The above example shows that NIP does not imply NDV. This is an interesting result, contrary to our original
expectation.1 It depends on the choice to model the inputs of the system by means of MS. We believe that
such a choice is a fair one in the case of real systems; in fact, in general, not all combinations of a single channel
input streams will turn out to be admissible system input streams. MS enables us to distinguish this aspect.
Example 2.20 stresses this point.
In reality, a user could use two channels to interfere with another user whereas he may not be interfering when
considering each channel on its own (see Example 2.12). Non-Interference does not capture such a behaviour
whereas the ﬁner Non-Deducibility can.
1Previous result [Sut86] stating that the two deﬁnitions coincide when they are deﬁned is due to the choice of the formalism
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If we add a condition ensuring that there is independence between the input streams observed in the channels,
then we get the following:
Proposition 2.21 (NIP ⇒ NDV)
Let Pi ⊆ Pinp and Po ⊆ Pout. If ∀M0, M′
0 ∈ MS,
∃M′′
0 ∈ PPi(M0) ∩ MS s.t. M′
0Pi = M′′
0Pi (2)
then Pi |:Po ⇒ Pi   ←→ Po.
Proof. If Pi = ∅ or Po = ∅, there is nothing to prove. Let2 (vi,∅) ∈ View(Pi) and (∅,wo) ∈ View(Po).
Using the deﬁnition of View( ), the former implies that there exists M′
0 ∈ MS such that M′
0Pi = vi, while
the latter implies that there exists M′′
0 ∈ MS and M′′ ∈ R(N,M′′
0 ) such that M′′
Po = wo.
Let us consider M0 ∈ PPi(M′′
0 ) such that M′′
0Po = vi, i.e., (vi,∅) ∈ ViewM0(Pi).
By condition (2), M0 ∈ MS and using NIP deﬁnition, we have R(N,M′′
0 )/Po = R(N,M0)/Po. Therefore
(vi,wi) ∈ ViewM0(Pi ∪ Po). This concludes the proof. 2
Note that the condition (2) requires Non-Deducibility between Pi and Pinp \Pi, that is, Pi   ←→ (Pinp \Pi). We
have written it in such a way to reﬂect the fact that it only depends on MS. Once again, condition (2) is not
a necessary condition, but it is suﬃcient to illustrate the point we want to make.
3 System Composition and Security
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne the composition operation for FIFNs and then study the eﬀect of this operation
on the security deﬁnitions given above in Section 2.
We consider a general form of the composition operation. The basic idea behind composition is that systems
are composed by sharing channels. In the net context, this means that nets are composed by sharing places—
input places of one net with the output places of another. This approach is inspired by the way in which
processes are composed in the process algebra approach to the semantics of concurrency
We use Millen’s proposal in [Mln90] and consider the composition operation to consist of two primitive
operations—parallel and feedback. We will ﬁrst consider the parallel operation and then look at the feedback.
3.1 Parallel Operation
In the case of the parallel operation, the two nets are just juxtaposed to make them run in parallel, whereas the
feedback operation merges the input and the output places of a net.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Parallel Operation)
Let N1 =  P1,T1,I1,O1,B1,Transop1,S1,M1  and N2 =  P2,T2,I2,O2,B2,Transop2,S2,M2  be two FIFNs
such that—up to an appropriate renaming—the respective sets of places and transitions are disjoint. The parallel
composition of N1 and N2 is a net N, also denoted as N1 ⊕ N2, deﬁned as follows:
N =  P1 ∪ P2,T1 ∪ T2,I1 ⊕ I2,O1 ⊕ O2,B1 ⊕ B2,Transop1 ⊕ Transop2,S1 ⊕ S2,M ,
where M = M1 ⊕ M2 = {M1 ⊕ M2 |M1 ∈ M1 and M2 ∈ M2}. 2
Let us now consider the parallel composition operation with respect to NIP and NDV. The two nets which
are to be composed will be denoted using N1 and N2, deﬁned as follows: N1 =  P1,T1,...,M1  and N2 =
 P2,T2,...,M2 . The composed net is denoted by N =  P,T,...,M . Moreover, NIP and NDV on the
composing nets are denoted as |: 1, |: 2,   ←→ 1 and   ←→ 2 respectively. Clearly the parallel composition is a secure
operation; it preserves all the relations existing in the two composing nets and creates new relations in the
composed net. These properties are given as follows:
2Here ∅ is the unique function with empty domain, i.e. the function with the empty graph.3.2 Feedback Operation 11
Proposition 3.2 (Parallel Composition and NIP, part I)
For any j = 1,2, I ⊆ (Pj)inp and O ⊆ (Pj)out, we have I |: jO ⇒ I |:O. 2
Proposition 3.3 (Parallel Composition and NIP, part II)
For any j = 1,2, I ⊆ (Pj)inp and O ⊆ (P3−j)out, we have I |:O. 2
Proposition 3.4 (Parallel Composition and NDV, part I)
For any j = 1,2 and Q1,Q2 ⊆ (Pj)ext, we have Q1   ←→ j Q2 ⇒ Q1   ←→ Q2. 2
Proposition 3.5 (Parallel Composition and NDV, part II)
For any j = 1,2, Q1 ⊆ (Pj)ext and Q2 ⊆ P3−j, we have Q1   ←→ Q2. 2
3.2 Feedback Operation
Let us now consider the feedback operation. In general, feedback is not a secure operation. Some earlier work has
demonstrated this. Within the net framework, we believe that the problems caused by the feedback operation
can be better understood and treated.
The feedback operation in a FIFN is deﬁned by giving
(i) a set of input places and a set of output places which are to be merged pairwise,
(ii) a function which speciﬁes the correspondence between the input and the output places and
(iii) an initial assignment which will become part of the state of the net with feedback.
The new set of initial assignments will be part of the old set, compatible with the assignment chosen to build
the state of the new net. Moreover, there must be compatibility between the input and the output places
which have been chosen to be merged, i.e., the operation associated with each transition must remain deﬁned
for all possible markings of the new net. This is ensured by the deﬁnition of feedbackable given below. Before
describing this, we need to give another deﬁnition which will help us to simplify the notation.
Deﬁnition 3.6
Let X, Y and Z be sets and f : Y → X be a one-to-one function. Let us deﬁne a concatenation operation with
respect to f (;f) of functions from X to Z∗ and from Y to Z∗ as follows:
∀M′ : Y → Z∗, ∀M : X → Z∗, M;f M′ : X → Z∗ and
∀x ∈ X, (M;f M′)(x) = M(p)M′(f−1(x)),
where the juxtaposition of values of M and M′ is the concatenation of strings. 2
Deﬁnition 3.7 (Feedbackable)
Let N be a FIFN Pi ⊆ Pinp Po ⊆ Pout and f : Po → Pi be a one-to-one function. Given Ms ∈ M, we say that
N is feedbackable via  f,Ms  if and only if
∀M0 ∈ M s.t. M0Pi = Ms
Pi, ∀M ∈ R(N,M0 ⊕ S)/Po, M0(Pinp\Pi) ⊕ (Ms
Pi;f M) ∈ M. 2
So, as anticipated, the condition under which a net is feedbackable is just a condition of soundness: feeding the
net with strings of tokens generated from the net itself in its output places, must lead to admissible markings,
including for the bounds on the size of the strings.
Note that in Deﬁnitions 3.7, we have |Pi| = |Po|.
Now, we are ready to give the deﬁnition of the feedback operation.
It consists of merging together the input and the output places as speciﬁed by f. The merged places become
internal places not anymore visible from outside the system and therefore not anymore usable for feedback
operations. Observe that even if f is a one-to-one function, we can still model compositions in which more
places are merged in one place (or viceversa) by simply adding a transition which collects the inputs and
delivers them (as a string) to the designed place.12 3 SYSTEM COMPOSITION AND SECURITY
Deﬁnition 3.8 (Feedback)
Given N =  P,T,I,O,B,Transop,S,M , Pi ⊆ Pinp, Po ⊆ Pout, f : Po → Pi and Ms ∈ M such that N is
feedbackable via  f,Ms , feedback of N via  f,Ms  is given by the net
N =  P \ Po,T,I,O,B(P\Po),Transop,S,M ,
where:
O(t) = O(t)[f(p)/p ∀p ∈ Po], that is, the numbered set O(t) modiﬁed by replacing all
the places in Po with the corresponding places in Pi;
S = S ⊕ Ms
Pi;
M =
n
M(Pinp\Pi)
￿
￿
￿ M ∈ M and MPi = Ms
Pi
o
. 2
In case of any possible confusion, NIP and NDV on a feedbacked net will be distinguished from the respective
relations on the original net by an appropriate subscript.
3.2.1 Feedback and NIP
Let us now consider the behaviour of NIP under the feedback operation. The ﬁrst point to note is that NIP
is not preserved by feedback. In the rest of the paper, we will use Pi and Po to denote the input and output
places respectively, which are connected via the feedback operation.
Proposition 3.9 (Feedback and NIP, part I)
Let I ⊆ Pinp \ Pi and O ⊆ Pout \ Po.
Then I |: NO  ⇒ I |:
NO
Proof. Consider the ﬁgure shown
alongside where N is the net obtained
from N with a feedback operation, I
and O are the singletons indicated in
ﬁgure and the operation corresponding
to both transitions of N is the identity.
We have I |: NO but I   |:
NO. This shows
that NIP is not preserved by feedback.
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
? ?
? ?
id id
I
O
N ￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
?
? 6
?
￿￿
￿￿
id id
I
O
N
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In the example above the problem is as follows: with feedback, we can create a link between a user connected to
I and a trojan horse hidden in the system in such a way that the user can now interfere with the user connected
to O. In order to forbid this, we need to ensure that no links capable of making I interfere with O due to
feedback are allowed. If we do this, we get the following result.
Proposition 3.10 (Feedback and NIP, part II)
Let I ⊆ Pinp \ Pi and O ⊆ Pout \ Po. Then (I ∪ Pi)|: NO ⇒ I |:
NO.
Proof. Let M0 ∈ MS and M
′
0 ∈ PI(M0) ∩ MS.
We will show that ∀M ∈ R(N,M0), ∃M
′
∈ R(N,M
′
0) such that M(O) = M
′
(O). This shows that
R(N,M0) ⊆ R(N,M
′
0). The other side of the inclusion can be shown in the same manner.
Taking such an M, let us consider the ﬁring sequence M0[σ M which generates it.
Let M0 = (M0(P\Pi) ⊕ Ms
Pi;f δ) where δ : Po → Tokens∗ represents the sequences of tokens generated
in Pi and used by some transition in σ. Then, in the net N, there exists a computation M0[σ M with
M(O) = M(O). Now let M′
0 ∈ P(I∪Pi)(M0) ∩ MS such that M′
0Pi = Ms
Pi, M′
0I = M
′
0I. By hypothesis,
there exists a M′
0[σ′ M′ such that M′(O) = M(O) = M(O). Therefore, in N, there exists M
′
0[σ′ M
′
such
that M
′
(O) = M′(O) = M(O) = M(O).
This concludes the proof. 2
There is another interesting case in the behaviour of NIP under feedback: this is the sequential composition
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Proposition 3.11 (Feedback and NIP, part III)
Given two FIFNs, N1 and N2, let us suppose
that there exists Po ⊆ (P1)out, Pi ⊆ (P2)inp,
f : Po → Pi and Ms ∈ (M1 ⊕ M2) such that
N1⊕N2 is feedbackable via  f,Ms  (see ﬁgure
alongside).
Let I ⊆ (P1)inp and O ⊆ (P2)out.
Then (I |: N1Po or Pi |: N2O) ⇒ I |: NO.
Proof. Standard.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
@ @ @ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿@ @
￿ ￿ @ @ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
" !
#  
￿￿
￿￿
Pi N1 N2
I
O
2
As we expect, in the case of sequential composition, if all the possible covert channels between two users are
removed in just one of the two systems being composed, we obtain a secure system.
The ﬁnal point that we would like to emphasize about feedback and NIP is that the reverse arrow in
Proposition 3.10 does not exist. This is stated by the next proposition.
Proposition 3.12 (Feedback and NIP, part IV)
I |:
NO  ⇒ (I ∪ Pi)|: NO.
Proof. Consider N and N in the ﬁgure shown beside,
where M = [{p1,p3} → {α,β,γ}], α,β,γ ∈ Tokens, and
Transop(t1)(α) = {α}, Transop(t1)(β) = {α},
Transop(t1)(γ) = {β}
and Transop(t2) = Transop(t1).
We then have
{p1}   |: N{p2}, {p3}   |: N{p4} but {p1}|:
N{p4}.
j j
j j
? ?
? ?
t1 t2
p1
p2
p3
p4
N j
j
j ?
? 6
?
￿￿
￿￿
t1 t2
p1
p4
N
2
The above proposition shows that it is possible to obtain a secure system by composing two non-secure systems!
3.2.2 Feedback and NDV
We now study the behaviour of NDV under the feedback operation. We will see that there is a strong similarity
between the two properties (NDV and NIP) with respect to feedback. Let us begin by showing that NDV is
not preserved by feedback.
Proposition 3.13 (Feedback and NDV, part I)
Let Q1,Q2 ⊆ Pext \(Pi ∪Po). Then Q1   ←→ N Q2  ⇒ Q1   ←→
N Q2.
Proof. Consider the nets in the ﬁgure shown alongside,
where M is the set of initial assignments M such that
M(p) ∈ {α,β}2 and M(pi),M(po) ∈ {ǫ,α,β}∪{α,β}2, with
α,β ∈ Tokens and where A2 denotes the set of strings on
A of length two. Suppose that Transop(t) is the function
which delivers in q the token from pi and delivers in p′
o the
token from p. We have {p}   ←→ N {q}.
Include feedback by choosing Ms =
n
(pi,α),(po,ǫ)
o
and
f : {p′
i,p′
o} → {pi,po} such that f(p′
i) = pi and f(p′
o) = po.
We have M =
n
{p} × {α,β}2
o
and {p} ←→
N {q}.
m
m
m
m
m
m
A A U
A A U
￿ ￿ ￿
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6
t id
p
q
pi p′
i
p′
o po m
m
m
m
A A U
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
@ @ R￿ ￿ ￿
@ @ I
t id
p
q
pi
po 2
The problem is the same as the one illustrated in the previous section on NIP. Solution is once again the same.
This proposition for NDV corresponds to Proposition 3.9 for NIP.14 4 FEEDBACK NON-DEDUCIBILITY ON VIEWS - A COMPOSABLE PROPERTY
Proposition 3.14 (Feedback and NDV II)
For any Q1,Q2 ⊆ Pext \ (Pi ∪ Po), we have (Q1 ∪ Pi)   ←→ N Q2 ⇒ Q1   ←→
N Q2.
Proof. ∀(vi,vo) ∈ ViewN(Q1), ∀(wi,wo) ∈ ViewN(Q2), we have a computation M′′
0 [σ′′ M′′ such that
M′′
0ℑ(Q2) = wi and M′′
O(Q1) = wo. As (Q1 ∪ Pi)   ←→ N Q2, we have a computation M′
0[σ′ M′ such that
M′
0ℑ(Q1) = vi, M′
0ℑ(Q2) = wi, M′
0Pi = Ms
Pi, M′
O(Q1) = vo and M′
O(Q2) = wo. Hence there exists a
computation M0[σ M in N such that M0ℑ(Q1) = vi, M0ℑ(Q2) = wi, M′
O(Q1) = vo and M′Qout
2 = wo.
This concludes the proof. 2
Once again the reverse arrow in Proposition 3.14 is false (cf. Proposition 3.12 for NIP).
Finally, there is no problem with sequential composition.
Proposition 3.15 (Feedback and NDV III)
Given FIFNs N1 and N2, let us suppose that there exists Po ⊆ (P1)out, Pi ⊆ (P2)inp, f : Po → Pi and
Ms ∈ (M1 ⊕ M2) such that N1 ⊕ N2 is feedbackable via  f,Ms  (see ﬁgure in Proposition 3.11).
Let Q1 ⊆ (P1)ext \ Po and Q2 ⊆ (P2)ext \ Pi. Then (Q1   ←→ N1 Po or Pi   ←→ N2 Q2) ⇒ Q1   ←→ N Q2.
Proof. Standard. 2
Proposition 3.16 (Feedback and NDV, part IV)
Q1   ←→ N Q2  ⇒ (Q1 ∪ Pi)   ←→
N Q2.
Proof. Easy to show using an example similar to the one considered in Proposition 3.12. 2
4 Feedback Non-Deducibility on Views - A Composable Property
The need for the having a realistic composable security property is well-known. In this section, we introduce
a new deﬁnition of information ﬂow which has the useful property of being preserved by both parallel and
feedback operations. That is, this information ﬂow security property is composable.
Reﬂecting back on the results of the previous section, the reader can notice a strange asymmetry in the roles
played by the input and output places involved in the feedback operation. “Control” of input places—by which
we mean having no information ﬂow between them and the places under observation—gives us the necessary
power to maintain security of a system with feedback, whereas the “control” of output places does not (see
Propositions 3.10 and 3.14).
Two views that are compatible in the original net can be incompatible in the feedbacked net. This is due
to the fact that the net is not able to produce in the feedbacked output places the tokens it needs in the
feedbacked input places. Hence it is not able to perform any of the computations which would make the views
compatible. Now, by controlling the input places involved in the feedback, we can ensure that each of those
computations has a corresponding one in the feedbacked net—having the same behaviour with respect to the
places under observation—by simply imposing that the computation makes no use of inputs taken from the
feedback mechanism.
The above observation is the starting point for deﬁning a new security property referred to as Feedback
Non-Deducibility on Views (FNDV).
Before deﬁning FNDV, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne the concepts of Feedback Simulating Net and Output Guided
Computation. We will not only require that each pair of views of two groups of places under observation be
compatible, but also need it to be compatible with at least one system Output Guided Computation (OGC),
for each Feedback Simulating Net (FSN).
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Feedback Simulating Nets (FSN))
Let N be a FIFN with I ⊆ Pinp and O ⊆ Pout. A Feedback Simulating Net on (I,O) is deﬁned as a 5-tuple:
 π,πi,πo,Mπ,Ms ,
where Ms ∈ M, π =  P π,T π,Iπ,Oπ,Bπ,Transopπ,Sπ,Mπ  is a FIFN, Mπ ∈ Mπ, πi : P π
o → I and
πo : O → P π
i are one-to-one functions, for P π
i ⊆ P π
inp and P π
o ⊆ P π
out, and and N ⊕ π is feedbackable via
 πi ⊕ πo,Ms ⊕ Mπ . 215
Therefore, a Feedback Simulating Net models the possible behaviours of a user which is aware of the system
history, of the system output in O and feeds it with tokens in I. Sometimes we will use just π to refer to a
Feedback Simulating Net. The choice to use π to denote a FSN is a deliberate one. The intention is to later
show some similarity with the Non-Deducibility of Strategies deﬁnition.
Now, an Output Guided Computation is a sequence of computations of the net which is guided by a Feedback
Simulating Net in the precise sense that it is the latter which decides what inputs in I the net will see at each
step.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Output Guided Computations (OGC))
Given a FIFN N, I ⊆ Pinp, O ⊆ Pout and given an FSN on (I,O), π,πi,πo,Mπ , an Output Guided Com-
putation on π is a sequence of ﬁring sequences of N,
M0
0[σ0 M0,M1
0[σ1 M1,...,Mn
0 [σn Mn
for which there exists a sequence of ﬁring sequences of π, M
0
0[σ0 M
0
,M
1
0[σ1 M
1
,...,M
n
0[σn M
n
such that
M0
0 ∈ MS and M0
0I = Ms
I, M
0
0 ∈ MS
π and M
0
0P π
i = Mπ
P π
i and for i = 0,...,n,
(i) Mi
0Pinp ∈ M; M
i
0P π
imp ∈ Mπ;
(ii) Mi
0O = O × {ǫ}; M
i
0P π
o = P π
o × {ǫ};
(iii) Mi
0I = M
i−1
I ;πi M
i−1
P π
o ; M
i
0P π
i = M
i−1
P π
i ;πo M
i−1
O ;
(iv) Mi
0P\(I∪O) = M
i−1
P\(I∪O); M
i
0P π\(P π
i ∪P π
o ) = M
i−1
P π\(P π
i ∪P π
o ).
The set of OGCs on π will be denoted by
P
π. 2
It is worth pointing out that an output guided computation is nothing but a computation of the net N ⊕ π
feedbacked via  πi ⊕ πo,Ms ⊕ Mπ  and indeed we could have given such a deﬁnition instead of Deﬁnition 4.2.
However, the motivation for our choice resides in the fact that we wanted to point out the analogy between
Output Guided Computations, Feedback Simulating Net on the one hand, and Strategies in the sense of Wittbold
and Johnson [WJ90, see also appendix B] on the other. Let us illustrate this using the following example.
Let us consider the nets N and π shown in ﬁgure below. Now, consider the input and output places
{i} ∪ {pπ
inp} and {o} ∪ {pπ
out} (see ﬁgure), such that πi(pπ
out) = i and πo(o) = pπ
inp. Now an output guided
computation, M0
0[σ0 M0,M1
0[σ1 M1,...,Mn
0 [σn Mn, together with M
0
0[σ0 M
0
,M
1
0[σ1 M
1
,...,M
n
0[σn M
n
,
works in the following way:
step 0 M0
0(i) = Ms(i)
σ0 −→ M0(o) = α0
M
0
0(pπ
inp) = Mπ(pπ
inp)
σ0 −→ M
0
(pπ
out) = β0
step 1 M1
0(i) = β0
σ1 −→ M1(o) = α1
M
1
0(pπ
inp) = α0
σ1 −→ M
1
(pπ
out) = β1
. . .
. . .
. . .
step n Mn
0 (i) = βn−1
σn −→ Mn(o) = αn
M
n
0(pπ
inp) = αn−1
σn −→ M
n
(pπ
out) = βn
.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
?
? 6
6
-
￿
πo
πi
N π
i
o
pπ
out
pπ
inp 2
Hence a FSN is a particular strategy, while an OGC is a computation of the system in the presence of a strategy
on (I,O). By varying the function calculated by the net π, all the strategies can be obtained. Furthermore,
Feedback Non-Deducibility on Views which we deﬁne now corresponds to Non-Deducibility on Strategies.
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Feedback Non-Deducibility on Views)
Let N be a FIFN, I ⊆ Pinp, O ⊆ Pout. Q1,Q2 ⊆ Pext \ (I ∪ O) are said to be Feedback Non-Deducible on
Views on (I,O), Q1   ←→ I,O Q2, if and only if
∀(vi,vo) ∈ View(Q1), ∀(wi,wo) ∈ View(Q2) and ∀π FSN on (I,O),
∃M0
0[σ0 M0,...,Mn
0 [σn Mn ∈
P
π such that M0
0ℑ(Q1) = vi; M0
0ℑ(Q2) = wi;
Mn
O(Q1) = vo; Mn
O(Q2) = wo. 216 4 FEEDBACK NON-DEDUCIBILITY ON VIEWS - A COMPOSABLE PROPERTY
Hence we ask each view of Q1 and each view of Q2 to be compatible in the sense that they can be observed in
the same computation. This is same as the condition required in the case of NDV. In addition, we require that,
for each FSN, at least one of those computations is actually an OGC.
Note that   ←→ ∅,∅=   ←→, since in this case the notion of FSN is trivial and, therefore, OGCs are nothing but
computations of the net.
The next proposition shows that FDNV is eﬀectively a restriction of NDV.
Proposition 4.4 (FNDV ⇒ NDV)
For any (I,O), Q1   ←→ I,O Q2 ⇒ Q1   ←→ Q2.
Proof. Obvious 2
Hence in the light of the above proposition and the ones given in earlier sections, we can depict the rela-
tionship between NIP, NDV and FNDV as follows:
'
&
$
%
￿
￿
￿
￿
NIP
F
N
D
V
NDV
4.1 Composition and Feedback Non-Deducibility on Views
In this subsection, we present the fundamental results regarding the behaviour of FNDV under composition.
Proposition 4.5 (Parallel Composition and FNDV, part I)
Let N1 be a FIFN, I1 ⊆ (P1)inp, O1 ⊆ (P1)out and
Q1,Q2 ⊆ (P1)ext \ (I1 ∪ O1) such that Q1   ←→ I1,O1 Q2.
Let us consider another FIFN, N2, and let N be the net obtained
by the parallel composition of N1 and N2.
Then, for each I2 ⊆ (P2)inp, O2 ⊆ (P2)out, said I = I1 ∪ I2 and
O = O1 ∪ O2, Q1 and Q2 are Feedback Non-Deducible on Views
on (I,O) in N, that is, Q1   ←→ I,O Q2.
Proof. Trivial.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
CC W
CC W
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ?
?
?
?
N1 N2
ℑ(Q1)
O(Q1)
ℑ(Q2)
O(Q2)
I1
O1
I2
O2 2
Hence parallel composition preserves all the FNDV relations which are true in the original nets. Let us now
consider the new relations induced by the composition. In general not all choices of Q1 and Q2 are acceptable.
Proposition 4.6 (Parallel Composition and FNDV, part II)
Let N1 and N2 be FIFNs, I1 ⊆ (P1)inp, O1 ⊆ (P1)out, I2 ⊆ (P2)inp,
O2 ⊆ (P2)out and Q1 ⊆ (P1)ext \ (I1 ∪ O1), Q2 ⊆ (P2)ext \ (I2 ∪ O2).
Let N be the net obtained by the parallel composition of N1 and N2, and let
I = I1 ∪ I2 and O = O1 ∪ O2.
Q1   ←→ I,O Q2 in N does not hold.
Proof. Easy to ﬁnd an example.
￿
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￿
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￿
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￿ ￿ ￿
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￿ ￿ ￿
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N1 N2
ℑ(Q1)
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The next proposition considers the conditions under which the Feedback Non-Deducibility of Q1 and Q2 is
preserved.4.1 Composition and Feedback Non-Deducibility on Views 17
First we need the following deﬁnition. In words, it states that a group of users is compatible Feedback
Simulating Nets on (I,O) if their set of view is not reduced under the action of any FSN playing on (I,O), i.e.
under any strategy involving the channels I ∪ O.
Deﬁnition 4.7 (Compatibility with FSNs)
Given a FIFN N, I ⊆ Pinp, O ⊆ Pout and Q ⊆ Pext \ (I ∪ O), we say that Q is compatible with FSNs on
(I,O), denoted as Q   ←−
I,O, if
∀(vi,vo) ∈ View(Q) and ∀π FSN on (I,O)
∃M0
0[σ0 M0,...,Mn
0 [σn Mn ∈
P
π such that M0
0ℑ(Q) = vi and Mn
O(Q) = vo. 2
Proposition 4.8 (Parallel Composition and FNDV, part III)
Taken N1, N2, I1, O1, I2, O2, Q1 and Q2 as in the previous proposition, let us suppose that Q1   ←−
I1,O1 in N1
and Q2   ←−
I2,O2 in N2. Then Q1   ←→ I,O Q2 in N.
Proof. Let (vi,vo) ∈ View(Q1), (wi,wo) ∈ View(Q2) and π =  π,pii,πo,Mπ,Ms  be an FSN on (I,O),
with π =  P π,T π,Iπ,Oπ,Bπ,Transopπ,Sπ,Mπ . Let P π
1 = π−1
o (I1) and P π
2 = π−1
o (I2).
Clearly, N π
1 =  π,πiP π
1 ,πoO1,Mπ,Ms
(P1)inp  is an FSN on (I1,O1). Therefore, by hypothesis, there exists
an OGC on N π
1
M
0
0[σ0 M
0,M
1
0[σ1 M
1,...,M
n
0 [σn M
n
and the corresponding M
0
0[σ0 M
0
,M
1
0[σ1 M
1
,...,M
n
0[σn M
n
, such that M0
0ℑ(Q1) = vi and Mn
O(Q1) = vo.
Now consider the net π in the ﬁnal marking of the OGC, namely M
n
. By simply moving the strings of
tokens in places P π
2 of π to the correspondent (via πi) places of N2, we have a new FSN N π
2 on (I2,O2).
Formally, we have π′ =  P π,T π,Iπ,Oπ,Bπ,Transopπ,S′π,Mπ , where S′π = M
n
P π
int and
N π
2 =  π′,πiP π
2 ,πoO2,M′π,M′s ,
where M′π = M
n
P π
inp and
￿
M′s = Ms
I2;πoO2 Mn
O2
￿
⊕ Ms
(P2)inp\I2.
Now, by hypothesis, there exists an OGC on N π
2
M
n+1
0 [σn+1 Mn+1,M
n+2
0 [σn+2 Mn+2,...,M
n+m
0 [σn+m Mn+m
and the corresponding M
n+1
0 [σn+1 M
n+1
,M
n+2
0 [σn+2 M
n+2
,......,M
n+m
0 [σn+m M
n+m
, such that
M
n+1
0ℑ(Q2) = wi and M
n+m
O(Q2) = wo.
Let M = Ms
I2 ⊕ M
n+1
(P1)inp\I2 ⊕ S2, where S2 is the initial state of the internal places of N2, and consider
the sequences of ﬁring sequences
(M0
0 ⊕ M)[σ0 (M0 ⊕ M),...,(Mn
0 ⊕ M)[σn (Mn ⊕ M),
(Mn
P1 ⊕ M
n+1
0 )[σn+1 (Mn
P1 ⊕ Mn+1),...,(Mn
P1 ⊕ M
n+m
0 )[σn+m (Mn
P1 ⊕ Mn+m),
and
M
0
0[σ0 M
0
,...,M
n
0[σn M
n
,M
n+1
0 [σn+1 M
n+1
,...,M
n+m
0 [σn+m M
n+m
.
Clearly we have that
(M0
0 ⊕ M)ℑ(Q1) = vi; (Mn ⊕ M)O(Q1) = vo;
(Mn
P1 ⊕ M
n+1
0 )ℑ(Q2) = wi; (Mn
P1 ⊕ Mn+m)O(Q2) = wo.
Observe that the sequences above do not form an OGC on π because conditions (ii) and (iii) in Deﬁni-
tion 4.2 are not satisﬁed. In particular in the M
i
0, i = 1,...,n, the output places in P π
2 are not necessarily
empty and their content is not moved to the correspondent places on N2. The symmetric case happens in
the rest of the sequences, for the M
n+i
0 and the places corresponding to P π
1 in N1. However, since π is a
FSN on (I,O) and, therefore, N1 ⊕π ⊕N2 is feedbackable via  πi ⊕πo,Ms ⊕Mπ , it is now a trivial task
to see that this problems can be eliminated in the obvious way, so getting an OGC on π in which (vi,vo)
and (wi,wo) are observed.
This concludes the proof. 218 5 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
Finally, we can show that FNDV is preserved by feedback.
Proposition 4.9 (Feedback and FNDV)
Let N be a FIFN with I ⊆ Pinp, O ⊆ Pout and
Q1,Q2 ⊆ Pext \ (I ∪ O) such that Q1   ←→ I,O Q2.
Let Po ⊆ O, Pi ⊆ I, f : Po → Pi and Ms ∈ N such that N is
feedbackable via  f,Ms  and let N be the feedbacked net.
Then, for each I′ ⊆ I \Pi and O′ ⊆ O \Po we have Q1   ←→
I′,O′ Q2
in N.
Proof. Trivial: each FSN π on (I′,O′) for the net N can
be thought of as a FSN π ⊕ π′ on (I,O) for N where π′ is
the net which takes the tokens in Po and delivers them to
the corresponding (via f) places Pi without modifying them
and which takes the tokens in O \(O′ ∪Po) and loses them.
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?
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5 Conclusions and Further Work
First we brieﬂy summarise the main results described in this paper and then consider some of the implications
of this work.
Summary
We started by introducing FIFO Information Flow Nets (FIFN) model. FIFN is based on Petri nets and
has been derived from the work described in [Var89], [Var90] and [Rou86]. Using this new model, we then
presented the information ﬂow security properties Non-Interference on Places (NIP) and Non-Deducibility on
Views (NDV) which correspond to Non-Interference and Non-Deducibility on Inputs. Then we went on to show
that in the FIFN context, NIP does not always imply NDV and developed conditions under which this is true.
We then considered a general composition operation and showed that neither NIP nor NDV is preserved under
this operation. This led to the deﬁnition of a new information ﬂow security property, referred to as the Feedback
Non-Deducibility on Views (FNDV), which is shown to be preserved under the composition operation. We then
showed the similarities between FNDV and Non-Deducibility on Strategies recently proposed by [WJ90].
Remarks
This paper has reported several new ideas in the area of information ﬂow security. The proposed FIFN model
is mathematically based and avoids unrealistic hypotheses such as inﬁnite buﬀers, total inputs, non-blocking
communication or inﬁnitely fast systems.
We believe that the FIFNs provide a uniform framework for specifying several information ﬂow security
properties. This is supported by the fact that we are able to model the major information ﬂow security
deﬁnitions using FIFNs (without bringing any conceptual change to the original deﬁnitions). The signiﬁcance
of this is that one is able to compare the diﬀerent notions of information ﬂow security using a single underlying
computational model. This we believe was one of the major deﬁciencies of the earlier work. The assumption
we made about the channels was their FIFO organization. This is not a strong hypothesis as it reﬂects the
way in which computer systems are usually organized. Furthermore, in an expressive enough formalism, any
buﬀer policy can be implemented using FIFO buﬀers as a primitive tool by means of processes which read the
messages in the FIFO order and organize them in their internal memory in the order speciﬁed by the desired
policy. We believe that this is also the case for the FIFN formalism.
It may seem at times that the model presented in this paper is a bit heavy to handle. This is partly due
to notations and partly due to the level of generality with which we wanted to treat the problems. Part of the
complexity of the notations is due to the fact that we have given net based formulations of previously deﬁned
concepts. We feel that new deﬁnitions of information ﬂow (e.g. in [Var90]) using typical characteristics of nets
will be simpler.References 19
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A Petri Nets
In this appendix, we give a very brief introduction to some of the fundamental principles of Petri nets which
are relevant to this paper. For detailed treatment of Petri nets, the reader is referred to [Pets81], [Rei85].
A Petri net is a particular kind of a directed graph with two types of nodes, namely the places (graphically
depicted as circles) and the transitions (graphically depicted as bars). The basic structure of a Petri net consists
of a set of places, a set of transitions and a set of directed arcs which connect the transitions and the places.
An arc directed from a place pi to a transition tj deﬁnes that place to be an input place of transition tj.
Similarly, an arc connecting transition tj to a place pk implies that the place pk is an output place of the
transition tj. In particular, a place can be a multiple input or output place of a certain transition and this is
represented using multiple arcs.
The state of a Petri net is described by the distribution of markers, called tokens in the places of the net.
Tokens are represented by dots drawn inside the places which have them. A particular assignment of tokens
is referred to as the marking of the Petri net. Formally, markings can be described as mappings from the set
of places of the net to I N, the set of natural numbers, which associate with a place the number of tokens it
contains.
A Petri net can be formally deﬁne as follows [Pets81]:
Deﬁnition A.1 (Petri Nets)
A Petri Net N is deﬁned as a ﬁve tuple, N =  P,T,I,O,M0 , given by:
P = {p1,p2,...,pn} is a ﬁnite set of Places
T = {t1,t2,...,tm} is a ﬁnite set of Transitions
I : T → [P → I N] is the input function which maps a transition to a bag of places.
O : T → [P → I N] is the output function which maps a transition to a bag of places.
M0 ∈ [P → I N] is a bag representing the initial marking of the net. 2
Note that a bag is similar to a set, in that it is a collection of items, except that multiple occurrence of items
is allowed.
A place pi is an input place to a transition tj if pi ∈ I(tj), and pi is an output place of the transition if
pi ∈ O(tj). The input and output functions can be extended to map places to bags of transitions, so that we
can refer to tj as an input or output transition of the place pi.
Deﬁnition A.2 (Transitions Enabled)
A transition tj in a marked Petri net N =  P,T,I,O,M0  with marking M is enabled if
∀pi ∈ P, M(pi) ≥ mult(pi,I(tj)),
where mult(x,Y ) is the multiplicity of item x in bag Y. 2
Deﬁnition A.3 (Firing Rule)
A transition tj in a marked Petri net with marking M may ﬁre whenever it is enabled. Firing results in a new
marking M′ deﬁned by:
M′(pi) = M(pi) − mult(pi,I(tj)) + mult(pi,O(tj)), for each pi ∈ P.
2
So we see that two sequences result from the execution of a Petri net, namely the marking sequence and
the ﬁring sequence. The sequence of markings correspond to the sequence of states reached by the net and the
sequence of transitions reﬂect the transitions that were ﬁred during the execution of the Petri net.
Deﬁnition A.4 (Immediate Reachability)
A marking M′ is immediately reachable from a marking M if the ﬁring of some transition t in M will yield
M′. We will write this as M[t M′. 221
Deﬁnition A.5 (Reachability)
A marking M′ is reachable from M if it is immediately reachable from M or is reachable from any marking
which is immediately reachable from M or if it is M itself. Thus M′ is reachable from M if there exists a ﬁring
sequence t1,...,tn starting from M that results in M′, that is, M[t1,...,tn M′. 2
We can now deﬁne the set of reachable markings from some initial marking M to be R(N,M).
Deﬁnition A.6 (Reachability Set and Firing Sequences)
Given a Petri net N, with initial marking M0, the reachability set for M is deﬁned to be
R(N,M0) =
n
M1 ∈ [P → I N]
￿
￿
￿ ∃σ ∈ T
∗ and M0[σ M
o
.
The set of ﬁring sequences of N is deﬁned to be
FS(N,M0) =
n
σ ∈ T
∗ |∃M ∈ R(N,M0) and M0[σ M
o
.
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B Security
In this appendix, we will give some basic results about security, which constitute the starting point for our
work and are necessary to understand the present paper. Actually, we will just recall the main concepts of
Non-Interference [GM82], Non-Deducibility [Sut86] and Non-Deducibility on Strategy [WJ90], simpliﬁng and
purging the exposition as much as possible. The reader who needs a wider introduction or wants to know the
other approaches which have been developed is referred to the bibliography [BLP74, Lan81, Den83, McC88,
JT88, Mln90]
Non-Interference
The results in this subsection are due to Goguen and Meseguer and can be found in [GM82].
Goguen and Meseguer base their approach to security on an abstract machine used to describe systems and
a basic mechanism, the Non-Interference assertion, used to specify security policies.
Informally, a Non-Interference assertion between two groups of users is a statement of the kind:
“ what a group of users does using the system has
no eﬀect on what the other group of users sees”.
A security policy can be expressed by means of Non-Interference assertions ensuring that information does not
ﬂow where it should not.
Let us give the previous concepts in a formal way.
Deﬁnition B.1 (State Machine)
A state machine M consists of the following:
• a set U whose elements are called users;
• a set S whose elements are called states;
• a set C whose elements are calles commands;
• a set Out whose elements are called outputs;
• a function out : S × U → Out which represents the users view, called output function;
• a function do : S ×U ×C → S which represents the updating of the state, called state transition function;
• a constant s0 ∈ S, called initial machine state. 2
We can extend the state transition function in the classical way to describe computations, i.e. the eﬀects of
strings of inputs on the machine state, and deﬁne what an user view of a computation is.
Deﬁnition B.2 (Computations and Views)
Given a state machine M we deﬁne sdo : S × (U × C)∗ → S by the equations
sdo(s,ǫ) = s and
sdo
￿
s,w   (u,c)
￿
= do
￿
sdo(s,w),u,c
￿
with s ∈ S, u ∈ U, c ∈ C and w ∈ (U × C)∗
where ǫ is the empty string and “ ” denotes strings concatenation.
Moreover, ∀u ∈ U we deﬁne      u : (U × C)∗ → Out, the view of the user u, by the equation
 w u = out
￿
sdo(s0,w)
￿
∀w ∈ (U × C)∗ 2
Deﬁnition B.3 (Purged Inputs)
Given G ⊆ U and w ∈ (U ×C)∗ we denote by PG(w) the subsequence obtained from w purging those pairs (u,c)
with u ∈ G. 223
Finally, we are ready for the deﬁnition of Non-Interference.
Deﬁnition B.4 (Non-Interference)
Given a state machine M and sets G,G′ ∈ U, G is non-interfering with G′, written G|:G′, if and only if
 w u =  PG(w) u ∀w ∈ (U × C)∗ and ∀u ∈ G′ 2
It has been noticed that the model chosen by Goguen and Meseguer is not completely general, because, by
assuming that the output and the state are functions of the input, they restrict their approach to deterministic
systems.
Non-Deducibility
Starting from the ﬁnal consideration of the previous subsection, Sutherland has developed his deﬁnition of
Non-Deducibility [Sut86].
In this approach a system is represented as a set of possible worlds, corresponding to the set of possible
execution sequences of an automata, users views are represented by information functions which extract a par-
ticular view of the system from a world, and the basic mechanism to express security policies is the information
ﬂow, whose meaning is explained by the following:
Deﬁnition B.5 (Information Flow I)
Given the set of possible worlds W, a set V of views and f,g : W → V information functions, information does
not ﬂow from f to g if and only if the function f × g : W × W → Img(f) × Img(g) is onto. 2
The previous deﬁnition can be given in an equivalent way, which is, perhaps, more intuitive [WJ90].
Deﬁnition B.6 (Information Flow II)
Given W,f and g as above information ﬂows from f to g if and only if there exist w ∈ Img(g) and v ∈ Img(f)
such that for each world (trace) t ∈ W f(t) = v ⇒ g(t)  = w. 2
The interpretation of the latter is very easy: when the user represented by f observes v, he will know something
about what the user represented by g sees, exactly that it is not w.
A security policy can be expressed by means of a predicate legal-to-get over pairs of information functions
which speciﬁes from where to where information is supposed to ﬂow legally in the system under observation.
Deﬁnition B.7 (Secure System)
Given a set of possible worlds W, a set of information functions ℑ and a predicate legal-to-get ⊆ ℑ×ℑ, we say
that the system (W,ℑ) is secure if and only if whenever information ﬂows from f to g, both belonging to ℑ,
then legal-to-get(f,g). 2
Sutherland’s deﬁnition solves the problem of treating nondeterminism generalizing the Non-Interference,
having been proved that in case of deterministic systems the two deﬁnitions do coincide, but it is not composable,
in the sense that composing two systems for which the deﬁnition holds a non-secure system can be obtained.
Non-Deducibility on Strategy
An answer to the problem of composability has been given by Wittbold and Johnson [WJ90] deﬁning a restriction
of Non-Deducibility preserved under composition. In this subsection we will recall their deﬁnition.
The model consist of a synchronized nondeterministic state machine, controlled by two users/processes, T
(high transmitter) and R (low receiver), which send their inputs to the machine contemporarily. From the
inputs and the state the machine produces deterministically, the outputs, which are delivered contemporarily
to the users, and nondeterministically its new state.
The formal deﬁnitions follows.24 B SECURITY
Deﬁnition B.8 (Synchronised State Machine)
A synchronized state machine M consists of the following:
• S, the set of states with S0 ∈ S the set of initial states;
• IR, the set of inputs from receiver R;
• IT, the set of inputs from trasmitter T;
• OR, the set of outputs to receiver R;
• OT, the set of outputs to transmitter T;
• N : S × IR × IT → ℘(S) \ ∅, the next-state function;
• OutR : S × IR × IT → OR, the output function for R;
• OutT : S × IR × IT → OT, the output function for T. 2
Deﬁnition B.9 (Moves and Traces)
A move of a synchronized state machine M has the form sm−1(im,jm,km,lm)sm, where sm−1,sm ∈ S, im ∈ IR,
jm ∈ IT, km ∈ OR, lm ∈ OT such that
sm ∈ N(sm−1,im,jm);
OR(sm−1,im,jm) = km;
OT(sm−1,im,jm) = lm.
A trace or execution of the state machine is a ﬁnite sequence of moves starting from an initial state s0 ∈ S0. 2
The basic security mechanism is constituted by strategies, low views (the projection on low inputs and outputs
of traces) and the concept of consistence between them. A strategy for a user/process links its input with its
past input/output history, that is it can determinate the next input from the process looking at its previous
inputs and outputs. Formally, a strategy is a function from sequences of pairs (input,output) of a user/process
to the its input, as stated by the following.
Deﬁnition B.10 (High Transmitter Strategies)
A strategy of length n is a sequence of n functions π = (π1,...,πn) where for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
πi : (IT × OT)(i−1) → IT. 2
Deﬁnition B.11 (Compatibility and Consistence)
Let t = s0(i1,j1,k1,l1)s1,...,sn−1(in,jn,kn,ln)sn, be a trace of length n, π = (π1,...,πn) be a strategy of
length n and λ = (ı1,k1,...,ın,kn) be a low view of length n. We say that:
i. λ is compatible with t if and only if ır = ir and kr = kr for each 1 ≤ r ≤ n, i.e. the view is the low
projection of the trace.
ii. π is compatible with t if and only if πr(j1,l1,...,jr−1,lr−1) = jr) for each 1 ≤ r ≤ n, i.e. the strategy is
contained in the trace.
iii. λ is consistent with π if and only if there exists a trace t such that λ and π are compatible with t, i.e. they
can be observed in the same trace. 2
Finally, we can give the deﬁnition of security for system, saying that a system is non-deducible on strategy if
whatever view the low receiver has, every strategy can have been used by the high transmitter.
Deﬁnition B.12 (Non-Deducibility on Strategy)
A synchronized state machine is Non-Deducible on Strategy if and only if for any n, any low view of length n
is consistent with any strategy of the same length. 2